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ARTICLES 
 
EXTENDING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 4(K)(2):   
A WAY TO (PARTIALLY) CLEAN UP  
THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION MESS 
PATRICK J. BORCHERS* 
The Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has become 
increasingly constricted and remains unclear on many crucial questions.  However, 
it appears that the Court will not rethink its basic approach to determining whether 
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state.  The Supreme Court 
has heard five cases concerning personal jurisdiction since 2011, and it has 
decided all five in favor of defendants.  As a result, U.S. plaintiffs can be left 
without a U.S. forum, even though they are injured in the United States by 
foreign corporations and the suits arise from the foreign corporations’ purposeful 
efforts to benefit from the U.S. market.  Moreover, other important issues, such 
as the significance of virtual contacts, lie unresolved.  This Article proposes a 
practicable solution to the worst of the problems:  the lack of a U.S. forum for 
domestic plaintiffs injured in the United States by foreign defendants.  The 
proposed solution is to extend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)—which 
in its current form allows for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal question 
cases in which the plaintiff would not have another U.S. forum—to include 
diversity and alienage cases.  While this solution would not resolve all difficult 
issues, it would work to the advantage of U.S. plaintiffs by ensuring a local 
forum and benefit U.S. defendants by leveling the playing field between them 
and their foreign counterparts.  This Article then considers whether the Rules 
                                               
 * Lillis Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.  
Thanks to Professors Peter Hay, Richard Freer, Irina Fox, Michael Hoffheimer, 
Christopher Whytock, and the Hon. Richard Kopf for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
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Enabling Act would authorize an extension of Federal Rule 4(k)(2) and if it 
would be constitutional.  The Article concludes that an extended Rule 4(k)(2) 
would survive challenges under both the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am tired of writing articles complaining about the dismal state of 
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—and 
complain I have.  I have argued that the Constitution does not require 
significant restraints on jurisdiction.1  I have argued that the famous 
case of Pennoyer v. Neff2 quite plausibly invoked the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment only to guarantee the defendant a right 
to challenge jurisdiction, not to regulate the limits of state-court 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the whole notion that the Supreme Court needs to 
closely supervise assertions of personal jurisdiction might be a giant 
misunderstanding.3  I have argued that the Supreme Court’s recent 
                                               
 
 1. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers:  An Essay on a Unified Theory of 
Procedural Due Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 343, 346–48 (2007). 
 2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 3. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:  
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 38–51 (1990).  
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decisions are wrong, badly reasoned, or both.4  I have argued that the 
current restraints on jurisdiction are at least as severe as those imposed 
by the implied consent and presence fictions that pre-dated the 
current “minimum contacts” test the Court first announced in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.5  But I, and like-minded 
commentators, have not made any headway with the Court.6  So my 
aim in this Article is to propose a solution other than having the Court 
completely rethink its approach to personal jurisdiction, which 
appears unlikely to occur.7 
Not all commentators are as despondent as am I.  Some have 
applauded the Court’s recent opinions restricting corporate general 
jurisdiction8—that is, jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum 
                                               
For a related argument regarding Pennoyer, see Steven E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1309–14 (2017), which asserts that the discussion of the Due Process 
Clause in Pennoyer may have been dicta, but the case was correctly decided regardless. 
 4. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the 
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245–46 (2011). 
 5. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum 
Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014). 
 6. However, of some personal consolation, the Supreme Court cited one of my 
articles.  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n.9 (2014) (citing Patrick J. 
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139 (2001) 
(“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows 
plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would deny 
it.”)).  My point was that a relatively expansive notion of general jurisdiction was 
necessary to fill in the gaps left by overly constricted specific jurisdiction principles.  
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and its progeny’s 
retraction of corporate general jurisdiction to the corporation’s “home” would, in my 
view, be unproblematic if it did not leave many plaintiffs without any U.S. forum, even 
when foreign defendants injure plaintiffs in the United States and in so doing reap the 
benefits of the U.S. market. 
 7. See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, NW. U. L. 
REV., 1301, 1305 (2014) (explaining why the Supreme Court is unlikely to rethink its 
approach to personal jurisdiction). 
 8. See, e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1081 (2012) (contending that the restrictive view offered in 
Goodyear simplified the general personal jurisdiction analysis); Michael H. Hoffheimer, 
General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 
U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 572–73 (2012) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s attempt in Goodyear 
to clarify the level of activity required for general personal jurisdiction); Wm. Grayson 
Lambert, The Necessary Narrowing of General Personal Jurisdiction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 375, 
375 (2016) (arguing that the restrictive interpretation of general personal jurisdiction 
provides a sense of consistency and predictability). 
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state unrelated to the suit9—to states where the defendant is 
“essentially at home.”10  I would have little problem with so restricting 
general jurisdiction if specific jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction based 
on contacts with the forum state related to the suit11—had not become 
unreasonably constricted.  Many commentators agree that there are at 
least some problematic aspects to personal jurisdiction law.12  
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s failure to decide important issues that 
are splitting lower courts—such as the significance of virtual contacts,13 
the degree to which defendants must target a forum state in products 
liability suits based on local injuries,14 the line between related and 
unrelated contacts,15 and so on—has left lower courts trying to make 
sense out of the nonsense.16 
                                               
 9. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:  A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the terms “specific” 
and “general” jurisdiction). 
 10. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915. 
 11. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1785 n.2 
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing recent limitations on general 
jurisdiction as “ill advised”). 
 12. See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant 
Contacts:  General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 
104–07 (2015) (noting that even though Justice Ginsburg’s analysis in Daimler was 
reasoned in protecting corporations from unduly burdens, the same consideration was 
not given to the burdens that individuals will face, and thus corporations are given 
“unprecedented” power to predetermine what states or countries they can be sued in 
and what law will apply to them); Donald L. Doernberg, Resolving International Shoe, 
2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 247, 254–55 (2014) (recognizing the imbalance between 
corporations and individuals regarding personal jurisdiction); Richard D. Freer, Some 
Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161, 1164–65 (2015) 
(commenting that the Court has had “historic failure [in] explain[ing] the function 
of general jurisdiction”); Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction, 
95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (2016) (questioning the viability of personal jurisdiction). 
 13. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 890 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (questioning the sufficiency of rules limiting jurisdiction 
in relation to virtual contacts); see also infra notes 179–94 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 
548 n.26 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that the stream-of-commerce test contradicts the 
McIntyre plurality test because the stream-of-commerce test does not require that the 
defendant target the forum state). 
 15. See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579–85 
(Tex. 2007) (examining the various tests courts have developed to address how close 
a defendant’s forum activities must be to the cause of action). 
 16. See, e.g., Lambeth Magnetic Structures, L.L.C. v. Toshiba Corp., No. 14-1526, 
2017 WL 782892, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2017) (considering the various tests available 
and finding the O’Connor test to be most suitable). 
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However, there is a relatively straightforward (albeit partial) 
solution, which is to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to 
include cases brought in federal court on diversity of citizenship or 
alienage grounds.17  This Article is not the first to mention the 
extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases,18 but the 
possibility of so extending Rule 4(k)(2)—and the potential objections 
to doing so—have received little attention thus far. 
Rule 4(k)(2) currently allows federal courts in federal question cases 
(maybe in admiralty, too19) to extend their jurisdictional reach to the 
constitutional limits if no U.S. forum would otherwise have 
jurisdiction.20  Because federal courts are organs of the federal 
government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment governs 
them, while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states.21  Although 
the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue,22 most lower courts 
and other authorities are of the opinion that some variant of the 
“national contacts” test applies to cases under the Fifth Amendment.23  
This test asks not whether the defendant has minimum contacts with 
any particular state but rather with the United States as a whole.24  The 
                                               
 17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases 
between citizens of different states and citizens of a foreign state and citizens of a U.S. state). 
 18. I briefly mentioned the possibility after the J. McIntyre decision, see Borchers, 
supra note 4, at 1274–75, and at least three other commentators also noted it.  See 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011:  Twenty-Fifth Annual 
Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 305 (2012); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court 
and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 348 (2012).  Professor Steven E. Sachs, 
picking up on my brief post-J. McIntyre suggestion, discusses it and argues that an 
expanded Rule 4(k)(2) would not do enough to solve the problems.  See Stephen E. 
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1325 
(2014).  His proposal is for a federal statute, but—as I discuss—I believe that a federal 
statute is politically infeasible.  See infra notes 233–38 and accompanying text.  One 
commentator has suggested revising Rule 4(k)(1)(A), but only in federal question cases.  
See Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts:  Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and 
Stafford v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 716–17 (2015) (advocating for this 
change to give plaintiffs multiple U.S. forums in federal question cases). 
 19. See, e.g., World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 723 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (“[W]e conclude that federal law includes admiralty cases for the purposes 
of Rule 4(k)(2).”). 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 21. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
479–80 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that in federal litigation the Fifth Amendment limits 
federal authority and in state litigation the Fourteenth Amendment limits state authority). 
 22. See infra notes 265–70 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 269–87 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra note 269–70 and accompanying text. 
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plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery Co. v. Nicastro25 suggested in 
dictum that a federal statute conferring national personal jurisdiction 
in products liability cases would be constitutional.26  Assuming the Fifth 
Amendment allows national personal jurisdiction, a federal statute 
would cure the perverse result that some foreign defendants can 
benefit commercially from the U.S. market yet avoid suit in any U.S. 
court, even if the suit is based on those activities.27 
The chances of enacting such a federal statute are slim at best.  Even 
very limited efforts in this direction have failed to advance in 
Congress.28  Professor Steven E. Sachs has made a thoughtful argument 
for a federal statute to fix the jurisdictional mess.29  However, any 
attempt to enact through Congress even slightly plaintiff-friendly 
jurisdictional reform will run into devastating political opposition, 
regardless of which major party controls Congress or the White 
House.30  Business interests and the law firms that represent them have 
celebrated the slew of defense-friendly jurisdictional decisions of the 
last six years.31  It is vastly easier to stop legislation than to pass 
                                               
 25. 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 26. Id. at 885–86; see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480 n.6 
(collecting statutes authorizing “nationwide service” of process).  Admittedly, I lambasted 
the J. McIntyre plurality opinion as “quite possibly the most poorly reasoned and obtuse 
decision of the entire minimum contacts era.”  See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263. 
 27. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion) (agreeing that the 
defendant targeted the U.S. market). 
 28. See infra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1348–49. 
 30. A very limited effort to expand jurisdiction in products liability cases has failed 
to advance regardless of which major political party is in power.  See infra note 235. 
 31. For instance, consider just a snippet of commentary on the Supreme Court’s 
utterly unsurprising ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1781–84 (2017), in which the Court held that the forum state lacked specific 
jurisdiction over the non-residents’ products liability claim against the defendant 
because there was no connection between the forum state and their claim.  See, e.g., 
Sarah Karlin-Smith, Supreme Court Ruling in Drug Case Could Have Big Implications for 
Product Liability, POLITICO (June 19, 2017, 10:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2017/06/19/supreme-court-bristol-myers-squib-239712 (highlighting the 
disproportionate disadvantages for plaintiffs seeking to bring a claim against a 
corporate defendant resulting from the Bristol-Myers Squib decision); Andrew J. Pincus 
et al., Supreme Court’s Decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court Rejects Expansive 
View of Specific Jurisdiction, CLASS DEF. BLOG (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2017/01/supreme-court-will-review-two-
important-cases-regarding-scope-personal-jurisdiction (commenting that the Bristol-
Myers-Squibb decision served to recognize “important limits imposed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause on the ability of courts to adjudicate cases that 
aggregate the claims of plaintiffs from many jurisdictions”). 
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legislation, and considerable resources will inevitably pour into 
maintaining the current defense-friendly jurisdictional regime.  
However, meaningful (and controversial) changes to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are possible, as the major 2015 revisions to the rules 
show.32  Moreover, expanding Rule 4(k)(2) is unlikely to generate the 
political opposition that a broad federal jurisdictional statute would 
because amending Rule 4(k)(2) would—as a practical matter—mostly 
affect foreign defendants and work to the benefit of both U.S. plaintiffs 
and defendants.33 
In Part I, I review what I see as the most problematic aspects of the 
current state of personal jurisdiction law.  In Part II, I propose the 
extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases.  In Part III, I 
consider possible objections to adding diversity and alienage cases to 
the scope of Rule 4(k)(2).  These include possible practical 
shortcomings of this solution, whether it would violate the Rules 
Enabling Act,34 and whether it would violate the Constitution.  
Extending Rule 4(k)(2) would solve one of the worst practical 
problems created by the law of personal jurisdiction and an extension 
would not violate the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution. 
I.  PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS 
The current personal jurisdiction landscape is full of problems, the 
worst of which would be solved by extending Rule 4(k)(2).  What 
follows is a discussion of some of those problems.  While this is not an 
exhaustive catalog of all the problematic and unresolved issues lurking 
in jurisdiction jurisprudence, it nonetheless should make my point 
that jurisdiction law has problems that need fixing. 
A.  Non-Intentional Torts 
Specific jurisdiction as to non-intentional torts is unclear and too 
constricted.  The original sin was World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,35 which held that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction 
                                               
 32. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era?  Federal Civil Procedure After the 
2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2016) (“The recent amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were the most controversial in decades.”); see also Brian J. 
Pollack & Peter Swann, The Rules Governing Parties, Discovery and Disclosure, ARIZ. ATT’Y, 
Dec. 2016 at 18, 18–19 (noting controversy over whether to adopt new federal rules on 
the scope of discovery as part of the Arizona rules). 
 33. See infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text. 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 35. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
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over the New York dealer and the regional distributor of an automobile 
involved in an accident in the forum state.36  The plaintiffs in the case 
had brought a products liability action on the theory that the gas tank’s 
placement made the car vulnerable to igniting if struck from behind.37  
In denying jurisdiction, the Court gave short shrift to practical 
considerations, including the convenience of an Oklahoma forum 
(the bulk of the evidence was located there) and foreseeability that a 
mobile product such as a car would be used out of state.38  It held that 
considerations of “interstate federalism” could lead courts to deny 
jurisdiction to even the most convenient forum.39 
The Court, however, announced the “stream of commerce” test.40  Its 
citation to a famous state court decision implied strongly that selling a 
product in the forum state—through normal commercial channels—would 
create minimum contacts in a suit regarding the safety of the product.41 
Alas, matters turned out to be far from so simple.  In a 1987 decision, 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,42 the Court divided four-to-
                                               
 36. Id. at 298–99.  The back story of the case is extensively recounted in Charles 
W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 
1122 (1993).  Although the Supreme Court’s opinion assumed that the issues involved 
the convenience to the parties and state sovereignty, the motion to dismiss the dealer 
and the distributor from the case had nothing to do with either.  Instead, the 
defendants were trying to create full diversity and get the case removed from state to 
federal court, and they succeeded in doing so.  Id. at 1139.  The plaintiffs still had two 
deep-pocketed defendants—Audi and Volkswagen—as parties in the case, and in an 
era of joint-and-several liability, having the distributor and the dealer as parties only 
served to keep the case in a plaintiff-friendly state court venue.  Id. at 1127–28.  The 
defense’s strategy was to remove the case to federal court because it was a more 
defense-friendly forum.  Id. at 1128–29. 
 37. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288. 
 38. Id. at 295. 
 39. Id. at 294.  The Supreme Court seemed to back away from the sovereignty rationale 
just two years later.  See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (explaining that the Due Process Clause “makes no 
mention of federalism concerns”).  Recently, however, the sovereignty rationale has made a 
comeback.  See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879–80 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (relying on the “general rule” that the sovereign may exercise its power 
when the defendant avails himself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state). 
 40. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297–98 (“The forum State does not 
exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over 
a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”). 
 41. Id. at 297–98 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 
N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961) (holding that the manufacturer of a valve on a water heater was 
subject to jurisdiction where the manufacturer sold the heater in the forum state)). 
 42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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four-to-one on whether the sale of approximately 100,000 motorcycle 
tire valves in the forum state sufficed to establish minimum contacts in 
a case alleging a defect in one of the valves, leading to a tire blowout.43  
Four Justices opined that predictable sales were not enough unless 
accompanied by other indicia of affirmative efforts to serve the state 
market,44 four other Justices said that predictable sales sufficed,45 and 
one Justice refused to endorse either test.46  Lower courts were 
predictably confused.47 
Then, in 2011, the Court appeared poised to resolve the split in 
J. McIntyre but managed the remarkable feat of further confusing 
matters.48  The case involved a three-ton, $24,000 scrap metal recycling 
machine manufactured in and sold from England by an English 
corporation.49  A nominally independent (though similarly named) 
U.S. distributor in Ohio sold the machine to a buyer who had seen one 
at a trade show in Nevada and who thereafter bought and used it in 
New Jersey.50  The plaintiff, an operator who had four fingers of one 
hand sliced off by the machine while at work in New Jersey, sued the 
English manufacturer in New Jersey state court alleging that the 
machine was unreasonably unsafe.51 
The Court’s four-vote plurality opinion, which found that New Jersey 
violated the Constitution in taking jurisdiction, was laced with 
overwrought references to the threat to sovereignty caused by courts 
overstepping their boundaries.  The opinion called into question the 
                                               
 43. Id. at 105 (plurality opinion). 
 44. Id. at 112–13. 
 45. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 46. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
Justice Stevens endorsed neither test, reasoning that Asahi had minimum contacts 
under either test based on the volume of the sales of its valves in California.  Id. at 122. 
 47. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 419–21 (discussing the lack of 
consensus in lower courts on which test from Asahi to apply and to which types of cases). 
 48. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see also Kaitlyn 
Findley, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of Commerce Doctrine:  Interpreting Justice 
Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional 
Standards, 63 EMORY L.J. 695, 700 (2014) (“Yet again, the Court issued a split decision, 
reinforcing the divide between the competing tests in Asahi and seemingly cementing 
the doctrine’s analytical instability.”). 
 49. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., 564 U.S. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 894–96. 
 51. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
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entire stream-of-commerce concept.52  The likely controlling53 two-vote 
concurrence in the judgment refused to take sides in the debate 
regarding which stream-of-commerce test should prevail but found 
that because the record showed only one such machine having been 
sold in the forum state, its courts lacked jurisdiction under either 
version of the test.54  The dissent pointed to the defendant-
manufacturer’s obvious desire to take advantage of the U.S. market 
and the foreseeability of a New Jersey sale, and stated it would have 
found jurisdiction.55  Thus, the question of whether sale of an allegedly 
defective product in the forum state through ordinary commercial 
channels suffices for jurisdiction is no closer to resolution than it was 
three decades ago. 
Of course, many non-intentional tort cases do not involve products 
liability, but the products cases present the most difficult and 
interesting jurisdictional cases.  Moreover, the extent to which the 
defendant must target his actions at the forum state in non-products 
cases is not resolved in other contexts.56 
B.  General Jurisdiction 
Although the case law was a morass, many lower courts once took 
the view that some corporations have such extensive operations 
throughout the United States (take General Motors as an example) 
that they were subject to jurisdiction in any of the fifty states regardless 
of whether the suit bore any relationship to the forum state.57  This 
view drew from International Shoe, which stated that corporations were 
                                               
 52. See id. at 879–80. 
 53. See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1265 (“Because Justice Breyer’s opinion and the 
dissent commanded five votes combined, and the concurrence involved the narrowest 
rationale for invalidating the attempted exercise of jurisdiction, lower courts will likely 
follow Justice Breyer’s opinion.”). 
 54. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd., 564 U.S. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  One might argue that J. McIntyre at least makes clear that a single sale cannot 
suffice, but given the narrowness of Justice Breyer’s opinion, even that is not entirely 
clear.  If the single sale had been a multi-million-dollar jet, it is difficult to say whether 
the concurrence would have found the single sale sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
 55. Id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 424–27 (suggesting that the 
minimum contacts analysis can be instructive in navigating non-product negligence cases and 
the purposeful availment analysis can be instructive in non-product strict liability cases). 
 57. See generally Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2004) (noting case law employs broader theories than the 
academic calls to limit general jurisdiction). 
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subject to suit wherever they had “systematic and continuous” contacts; 
the Court held that having about a dozen salesmen and selling roughly 
$30,000 worth of shoes annually in the forum state sufficed.58 
Until recently, the Court did not have much to say about general 
jurisdiction.  In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,59 the Court 
held that a corporation was subject to jurisdiction in the state in which 
it had temporarily located its corporate headquarters.60  In Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,61 the Court held that four million 
dollars of unrelated purchases in the forum state was not enough to 
sustain jurisdiction.62  A huge range of activities lies between these 
poles, and lower courts were in the wilderness regarding what sufficed 
for general jurisdiction.63 
That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.64  Goodyear was an easy case that 
the North Carolina state courts got wrong.65  The suit arose after a 
European subsidiary of the American tire giant Goodyear 
                                               
 58. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that the activities 
of defendant were “systematic and continuous throughout the years in question”). 
 59. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 60. Id. at 447–48.  The Court now uncritically cites Perkins for the proposition that a 
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the state of its principal place of business.  
See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 928 (2011) 
(describing Perkins as “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately 
exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum” 
(quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).  
However, the case is not quite so clear as the Court now interprets it.  The Court’s 
opinion was very close to an advisory opinion, the suit was probably related to the 
corporation’s forum-state activities, and it is not clear how extensive the corporation’s 
forum-state activities were relative to other locations.  See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1251. 
 61. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 62. Id. at 411, 416.  The majority held that the plaintiffs conceded in their brief 
that the forum state activities were unrelated.  Id. at 414.  While the brief was not a model 
of clarity, Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the plaintiffs had not conceded the 
issue.  Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  He noted that they could have reasonably 
argued the contacts were related because one of the allegations was negligent pilot 
training—the case arose out of the crash of a helicopter the defendant owned—and 
at least some training had taken place in the forum state of Texas.  Id. at 425–26. 
 63. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 408–13 (arguing that “the quantum 
of unrelated contacts” is the most difficult aspect of the general jurisdiction analysis). 
 64. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 65. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (finding personal 
jurisdiction where defendant tire manufacturer exported and distributed a substantial 
number of its tires in the forum state), rev’d sub nom. Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 (holding 
that the defendant’s connection was too limited to the forum state to serve as the basis 
for general jurisdiction). 
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manufactured a tire that allegedly caused a bus accident in France.66  
The only contacts the subsidiaries had with the forum state were 
unrelated sales of about tens of thousands (out of tens of millions) of 
tires.67  To the surprise of virtually no one,68 the Court unanimously 
reversed and held that minimum contacts were lacking.69  The news 
out of Goodyear was that the Court announced a fresh test for corporate 
general jurisdiction:  the corporation must be “at home” or “essentially 
at home” (the Court used both formulations) in the forum.70  In 
subsequent cases, the Court made clear that it is serious about the new 
test, and corporations are probably subject to general jurisdiction only 
in the states of their principal place of business and incorporation.71  
Coupled with an earlier suggestion that contacts-based general 
jurisdiction does not apply to individuals72—thus limiting general 
jurisdiction over individual defendants to traditional bases, such as 
                                               
 66. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.  The Court held that Goodyear had not timely raised 
the question of whether the activities of the subsidiaries could be imputed to the 
parent U.S. corporation.  Id. at 930–31. 
 67. Id. at 921. 
 68. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 8, at 550 n.8 (2012) (predicting the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous reversal of the lower courts’ finding of jurisdiction). 
 69. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929–30. 
 70. Id. at 919, 929. 
 71. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (applying the 
Goodyear and Daimler “at home” test to determine jurisdiction).  While the Supreme 
Court has declined to create a categorical rule that a corporation is only “at home” in 
either its place of incorporation or principal place of business, cases finding a 
corporation “at home” anywhere else, if they exist, are rare indeed.  Id. at 1560 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is virtually inconceivable 
that such corporations will ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other 
than their principal places of business or of incorporation.”); see also Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017) (noting the California 
Supreme Court’s unanimous agreement that general jurisdiction was lacking). 
 72. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (plurality 
opinion).  Even prior to Burnham, cases finding general jurisdiction over individuals 
based on “systematic and continuous” contacts were extremely rare.  See HAY, BORCHERS 
& SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 408 (explaining that general jurisdiction over 
individuals is typically based on domicile or residence, but in rare cases the individual 
may have strong ties to a forum state other than where they are domiciled).  It seems 
likely that with the Court’s limitation of corporate general jurisdiction to the 
defendant’s home that the same rule applies to individuals.  Thus, general jurisdiction 
would be limited to a person’s domicile or where the defendant is physically served. 
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in-state service of process73 and domicile74—general jurisdiction has 
become extremely limited.75 
There is something to be said for reining in general jurisdiction.76  If 
a large corporation like General Motors were subject to jurisdiction in 
every state, its only defenses against blatant forum shopping would be 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens77 and venue transfer.78  But 
broader general jurisdiction sometimes acted as a safety valve to 
provide plaintiffs with a reasonable forum where specific jurisdiction 
would not.79  The Court should have fixed specific jurisdiction before 
it went to work on general jurisdiction. 
C.  Intentional Torts 
Intentional tort jurisdictional law was once a relatively clear spot in 
the jurisdictional fog.  In two cases decided the same day, Calder v. 
Jones80 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,81 the Court held that a 
plaintiff defamed by a publication could sue wherever the publication 
had substantial circulation.82  In so doing, the Court announced the 
“effects” test, which seemed to mean that if an intentional tort were 
committed by the defendant in one state and had a predictable effect on 
the plaintiff in the forum state, the defendant was subject to jurisdiction.83 
Matters became less clear, however, with the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous decision in Walden v. Fiore.84  In Walden, the plaintiffs were 
professional gamblers returning from Puerto Rico to their home in 
                                               
 73. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion) (reaffirming in-state service of 
process as a traditional basis for general jurisdiction). 
 74. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (finding that a defendant’s 
domicile is a fair basis for general jurisdiction). 
 75. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1784–85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Daimler severely limited general jurisdiction). 
 76. See supra note 8. 
 77. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (noting that a 
court may ordinarily dismiss a case when holding the trial in the plaintiff’s chosen 
forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or court). 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (allowing transfer in the interests of justice to a more 
convenient federal venue). 
 79. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 139 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an imperfect 
safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when 
specific jurisdiction would deny it.”). 
 80. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 81. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 82. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790–91; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74. 
 83. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
 84. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
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Nevada.85  Federal agents detained them at the Atlanta, Georgia, 
airport and seized $97,000 in cash.86  After repeated demands from the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, the government eventually returned the money to 
the plaintiffs in Nevada.87  The plaintiffs brought a Bivens action in a 
Nevada federal court against the agent, alleging essentially a 
federalized theory of trespass to chattels.88 
The plaintiffs alleged that the agents knew that they were Nevadans 
and argued that under the effects test, Nevada had minimum contacts 
because the plaintiffs lost the right to use the money in Nevada.89  The 
Supreme Court disagreed and unanimously reversed the Court of 
Appeals’ grant of jurisdiction.90  In a sentence sure now to be quoted 
by every defense brief on personal jurisdiction, the Court wrote:  
“[O]ur ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons 
who reside there.”91 
Although the Court tried mightily,92 the Walden decision is hard to 
square with Calder and Keeton.  In Walden, the Court explained that it 
had found jurisdiction in Calder because the plaintiff resided in the 
forum state and the defendant’s conduct affected her reputation 
there.93  The Walden Court noted that in its case the government 
deprived the plaintiffs of the use of the money no matter where they 
were located.94  But, in Keeton, Calder’s companion case, the Court 
considered it insignificant that the plaintiff had no connection to the 
forum state and chose it only for its long statute of limitations.95  
Realistically, the Keeton plaintiff had almost no reputation to lose in 
New Hampshire because the record showed she had never been there 
                                               
 85. Id. at 1119. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1126. 
 88. Id. at 1120 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971)) (recounting the plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant was unlawfully “keeping 
the money after concluding that it did not come from drug-related activity”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1126. 
 91. Id. at 1122.  The Supreme Court relied heavily on this concept in Bristol- Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017). 
 92. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–25 (distinguishing Walden from Calder and Keeton by noting 
that the defendant in Walden did not direct any activity toward the state, only the plaintiff). 
 93. Id. at 1124 & n.7 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984)). 
 94. Id. at 1125. 
 95. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984). 
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before the case began,96 and the Calder defendant affected the 
plaintiff’s reputation in California regardless of where the plaintiff was 
located when the magazine published the article.97 
Georgia may have been a better forum than Nevada for the Walden 
case.  But there is no constitutional rule that the plaintiff is allowed 
only one forum choice.  The issue is minimum contacts, not the most 
significant contacts.98  If the plaintiffs were truly forum shopping and 
Georgia was a more convenient forum, the federal venue transfer 
statute stood ready to shift the proceedings there.99 
D.  The Elusive Reasonableness Test 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court created—mostly out of whole 
cloth—a five-factor test for assessing the reasonableness of 
jurisdictional assertions.  The factors were:  (1) “the burden on the 
defendant”; (2) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute”; (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief”; (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5) “the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.”100  Ironically, in World-Wide Volkswagen, 
those factors pointed toward the Oklahoma forum—which the Court 
found could not exercise jurisdiction—because the bulk of the 
evidence was there and thus certainly the most convenience for the 
parties and witnesses.101  Nevertheless, the Court held that 
considerations of “interstate federalism” trumped convenience and 
fairness and Oklahoma’s attempted assertion of jurisdiction over the 
New York dealer and distributor was unconstitutional.102 
                                               
 96. See id. at 779–80 (noting that most of the harm to the plaintiff happened 
outside New Hampshire). 
 97. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 784–86 (making no mention of plaintiff’s physical 
location at the time of publication of the libelous story). 
 98. See Susanna Felleman, Note, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer:  A 
Proposed Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1525 (1995) (arguing that the minimum contacts test should 
be replaced by a “most significant contacts” test). 
 99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (allowing parties to change venue to a more 
convenient forum). 
 100. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 101. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Oklahoma was the location 
of the car accident, the plaintiff’s hospitalization, and essential witnesses and evidence). 
 102. Id. at 294 (majority opinion). 
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The five-factor reasonableness test re-emerged in Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz,103 in which the Court allowed the fast-food franchise giant 
Burger King to sue a Michigan franchisee for breach of contract in the 
franchisor’s home state of Florida.104  In that case, the test may have 
tipped the scales in favor of jurisdiction because the Court placed 
considerable emphasis on the duration and size of the contract.105 
The reasonableness test then dictated the result in Asahi.106  In Asahi, 
as noted above,107 the Court split four-to-four-to-one on whether 
predictable and substantial resale of a product in the forum state 
satisfied the stream-of-commerce test.  But remarkably, eight of the 
nine Justices agreed jurisdiction was unreasonable, and thus 
unconstitutional, on the more general grounds embodied in the five-
factor test.108  The Court pointed to the fact that the only remaining 
part of the suit was a third-party claim between the Japanese 
manufacturer of the motorcycle tire valve and the Taiwanese 
manufacturer of the tube-tire assembly.109  Given the ancillary nature 
of the third-party action—and that no domestic party remained in the 
case—the Court found jurisdiction to be unreasonable.110  This 
appeared to be big news because it clearly added another step to the 
constitutional test:  even if the defendant had minimum contacts with 
the forum state, it still might not be subject to jurisdiction.111 
Then the Court seemed to forget about the reasonableness test.  It 
is true that every case to reach the Supreme Court since Burger King—
with one exception112—found minimum contacts lacking, thus not 
requiring the majority and plurality opinions to reach the test.  But 
                                               
 103. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 104. See id. at 468, 477. 
 105. Id. at 479–80. 
 106. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) 
(plurality opinion) (applying the five-factor test to determine that jurisdiction over 
Asahi would be unreasonable). 
 107. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 108. Justice Scalia joined the opinion holding that minimum contacts were lacking 
but did not offer a view one way or the other on the reasonableness test.  See Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 105 (setting forth the votes of each Justice). 
 109. Id. at 114 (plurality opinion). 
 110. Id. at 113–14. 
 111. The Asahi reasonableness dismissal and the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
share some similarities, but the Court’s forum non conveniens decisions are a separate 
line of cases.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 112. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  However, only Justice 
Brennan, writing for himself and three other Justices, engaged in a minimum contacts 
analysis.  Id. at 637–39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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given that the reasonableness test was the basis for the holding in Asahi, 
it seems strange that the Court did not address the test’s five factors as 
alternative grounds for finding no jurisdiction or at least mention 
them.  Moreover, two extensive opinions—one a concurrence in the 
judgment113 and the other a dissent114—concluded that there was 
jurisdiction but made no serious effort to apply the five-factor test and 
discussed only minimum contacts.  The reasonableness test earned a 
brief mention in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in J. McIntyre, but she did 
not address it at any length even though she argued that jurisdiction 
was constitutional.115  In Burnham v. Superior Court,116 a case reaffirming 
in-state service of process as a basis for jurisdiction over individual 
defendants, Justice Brennan engaged in a minimum contacts analysis in 
his concurrence in the judgment but did not mention the reasonableness 
test, even though Asahi had been decided just three years earlier.117 
The Supreme Court finally addressed the reasonableness test’s 
applicability to general jurisdiction in Daimler.  Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion, which garnered eight votes, held that the auto giant Daimler-
Chrysler was not at home in California, even though it had significant 
contacts—dealerships and the like—in the forum state.118  The 
majority engaged in what Justice Sotomayor termed, in her 
concurrence in the judgment, a proportionality test with regard to 
contacts.119  Why is it, she wondered, having greater out-of-state 
contacts should count against jurisdiction if the in-state contacts were 
substantial enough to make the assertion of jurisdiction fair?120  Justice 
Sotomayor, however, concurred in the judgment because, in her view, 
the mostly foreign nature of the events and parties made jurisdiction 
unreasonable under the five-factor test.121  This earned a rebuke from 
Justice Ginsburg who stated that reasonableness analysis is 
                                               
 113. Id. 
 114. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 907–09 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 115. Id.  Justice Ginsburg cited Asahi and referred to fairness considerations but did 
not explicitly engage in a two-step analysis.  See id. at 908. 
 116. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 117. Id. at 637–39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 118. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). 
 119. See id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 120. Id. at 764 (“The problem, the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with 
California are too few, but that its contacts with other forums are too many.”). 
 121. Id. at 765. 
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“superfluous” in general jurisdiction cases and applicable only in 
specific jurisdiction cases.122 
But if the reasonableness test is applicable in specific jurisdiction 
cases, why did Justice Ginsburg not explicitly address it in her 
J. McIntyre dissent?  She would have found that the defendant was 
subject to jurisdiction,123 so if specific jurisdiction requires satisfaction 
of both the minimum contacts and the five-factor reasonableness test, 
she ought to have discussed both.  To really know whether the Court 
is serious about the reasonableness test will require a specific 
jurisdiction case in which the Court finds that there are minimum 
contacts.  The last case to do so unambiguously was the 1985 decision 
in Burger King,124 so it might be a long wait. 
The reasonableness test got barely a nod from the Supreme Court 
majority in its recent opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court.125  The majority found that the claims of the non-resident 
plaintiffs lacked specific jurisdiction because the contacts were not 
related to their claims.126  Justice Sotomayor, who would have found 
specific jurisdiction, addressed it directly in her dissent.127  It thus 
might be that she is the only Justice serious about the test. 
E.  What Counts as a Related Contact? 
Particularly with the contraction of general jurisdiction, the question 
of what counts as a related contact is more important than ever because 
unrelated contacts are worthless to the plaintiff unless, in the case of 
corporations, they amount to a business’s headquarters or state of 
incorporation.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not said much 
of use on the topic. 
                                               
 122. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion). 
 123. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 907–10 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 124. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).  One might make 
a case for the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in Asahi, as Justice Steven’s concurrence in 
the judgment would have found minimum contacts based on the volume of valves sold in 
the forum state.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121–22 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 125. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 126. Id. at 1781 (“[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did 
not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not 
injured by Plavix in California.”). 
 127. Id. at 1786–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no serious doubt that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims is reasonable.”). 
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As I have argued elsewhere, I do not believe that the International 
Shoe Court thought it was writing a landmark decision.128  Rather, the 
problem was that common-law concepts of jurisdiction, based 
principally on power over tangible things such as real property and 
people, did not fit well with corporations.129  The International Shoe Court 
faced two practical and pressing issues.  The first was that jurisdiction over 
corporations was being rationalized in two distinct lines of cases.  One line 
concerned whether the corporation was “present” in the forum (an effort 
to analogize to the physical presence of a person for purposes of service 
of process), and the other concerned whether the corporation’s 
business in the forum was sufficient to support the fiction that it 
implicitly consented to jurisdiction.130 
The other practical problem was that, at the time, courts thought 
“mere solicitation” of businesses in the forum was insufficient to 
support jurisdiction, but solicitation plus other activities sufficed.131  It 
seems likely that the International Shoe Co.’s odd business model of 
giving its sales force only one of a pair of shoes as demonstrators and 
requiring a customer to order the pair through its Missouri office was 
an effort to bring it within the definition of mere solicitation.132 
The International Shoe Court erased the line between mere 
solicitation and solicitation plus by bringing both within the rubric of 
minimum contacts.  The term minimum contacts also brought together 
the presence and implied consent cases, at least for corporations, 
under one analytical roof.133  What the Justices seem to have 
                                               
 128. See Borchers, supra note 5, at 14, 28 (explaining that International Shoe was a 
“fairly easy case” under the then-existing standards, and “[i]t is far from clear that the 
International Shoe Court meant to offer a grand unifying theory of judicial jurisdiction”). 
 129. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[I]t is 
clear that unlike an individual[, a corporation’s] ‘presence’ without, as well as within, 
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by 
those who are authorized to act for it.”). 
 130. Id. at 314–15. 
 131. Id. at 315.  It is difficult to miss the parallel to the current conundrum of 
whether resale alone or resale plus other activities is needed to support jurisdiction in 
products liability cases.  See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Borchers, supra note 5, at 28 (stating that International Shoe Co. likely used 
its business model to avoid jurisdiction). 
 133. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see also Erin F. Norris, Note, Why the Internet 
Isn’t Special:  Restoring Predictability to Personal Jurisdiction, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1013, 1019 
(2011) (explaining the use of the fictions of “presence” and “consent” to support 
jurisdiction and how the theories eventually merged to cover corporations that were 
“doing business” within a forum state). 
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forgotten—except for Justice Sotomayor134—is that International Shoe is 
an opinion couched in terms of fairness to the parties and had not 
even the faintest odor of sovereignty.  The Court stated “due process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, . . . he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”135  The decision is also couched in 
reasonableness terms, such as that due process requires only that “the 
state of the forum . . . make it reasonable . . . to require the 
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”136 
The general-specific dichotomy arose from mostly dictum in 
International Shoe.  The Court stated: “‘Presence’ in the state in this sense 
has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there 
have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the 
liabilities sued on . . . .”137  The Court viewed this approach as being 
the simplest case for jurisdiction as the cause of action arose from the 
forum-state activities, and apparently the Court viewed the case itself 
as easy because the dispute was about whether the corporation owed 
the state funds for unemployment compensation for the salesman.138 
The Court then described the straightforward case for not finding 
jurisdiction:  “Conversely it has been generally recognized that the 
casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or 
isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not 
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the 
activities there.”139 
Then came the sentence that launched general jurisdiction:  
“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate 
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”140  To Justice 
Sotomayor’s point regarding the radical contraction of general 
                                               
 134. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s animating concern . . . appears to be 
federalism . . . .”). 
 135. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). 
 136. Id. at 317. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 320 (finding the activities carried out in the forum state to be neither 
irregular or casual). 
 139. Id. at 317. 
 140. Id. at 318. 
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jurisdiction to a defendant’s home, the International Shoe Court viewed 
having a dozen salesmen and doing $30,000 a year of business in the 
forum as continuous and systematic contacts,141 which is a far cry from 
the forum state being the defendant’s home. 
Next came the sentence that launched specific jurisdiction:  “[Some 
isolated contacts,] because of their nature and quality and the 
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to 
render the corporation liable to suit.”142  In context, the Court here 
was clearly referring to forum contacts related to the suit.  Note, 
however, that the International Shoe Court used the terms “related,” 
“connected,” and “arising from” as if they were synonyms.143 
Semantically, the words “related” and “connected” connote a weaker 
relationship than “arising from.”144  “Arising from”—in ordinary 
usage—implies that nearly all the events giving rise to the suit took 
place in the forum.145  “Related” or “connected” implies that the 
contacts were part of a chain of events leading to the claim or at least 
connected with those events, but not necessarily the basis for liability 
itself.146  There are easy cases in which the contacts clearly qualify for 
specific jurisdiction under any formulation.  In one of the few post-
International Shoe decisions to find specific jurisdiction, McGee v. 
International Life Insurance Co.,147 the plaintiff sued for recovery on a life 
insurance policy sold in the forum to a forum resident.148  On any 
theory, the cause of action was related to, connected with, and arose 
from the forum contacts.149  Similarly, there are obvious cases of 
unrelated contacts.  In Goodyear, the tires sold in the forum state by the 
defendant were not the ones that caused the injury.150  Thus the 
defendant’s activities in the forum did not bear even the most tenuous 
connection to the cause of action. 
                                               
 141. Id. at 320. 
 142. Id. at 318. 
 143. Id. at 318–20 (using all three terms to delineate the sufficient level of contact 
to establish jurisdiction). 
 144. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring a “substantial difference” between the two standards). 
 145. See id. (stating that the court neglected to acknowledge this difference). 
 146. See id. (“[T]he wrongful-death claim filed by the respondents is significantly 
related to the undisputed contacts between Helicol and the forum.”). 
 147. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 148. Id. at 221–22. 
 149. See id. at 223 (holding that the suit was based on a contract that had a 
substantial connection with the forum state). 
 150. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
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But intermediate cases are dividing the lower courts.  Many cases 
follow what one might call the “vacation fact pattern.”  The defendant 
advertises in the resident’s forum state, and the forum resident decides 
to take a vacation, trip, or cruise out of state.  The forum resident is 
injured and returns home to sue.151  Are the forum state contacts 
sufficiently close to the cause of action to be treated as related contacts 
for specific jurisdiction purposes?  On the one hand, the plaintiff would 
never have experienced an injury but for the defendant’s intentional 
efforts to take advantage of the forum-state market.  On the other 
hand, few—if any—of the liability-creating events took place in the forum. 
Lower courts have staked out two major camps.  The minority uses 
the “but for” test.152  Under it, if the forum-state events have a causal 
relationship to the liability creating events, then the contacts are 
related.153  In the vacation cases, if advertising in the forum lures the 
plaintiff out of state to the location where the accident took place, it is 
a specific jurisdiction case.154 
A bevy of alternatives are applied elsewhere:  the “substantive 
relevance” test,155 the “proximate cause” test,156 the “substantial 
connection to operative facts” test,157 and so on.  While these 
alternatives may have slight differences, they share the same basic 
feature of rejecting the but for test’s minimal requirement of a causal 
relationship.  Instead, these tests demand that some or all of the 
                                               
 151. See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. 2007) 
(holding that a travel company did not have sufficient contacts with the forum state in 
which it advertised in a wrongful death action regarding a child’s hiking death). 
 152. See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that the “but for” test is similar, in its basic function, to the “arising out of” 
test), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 386 (finding that Carnival’s “forum-related” activities induced the 
plaintiff to take the cruise that precipitated her injury). 
 155. See, e.g., Tecre Co. v. Buttonpro, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Wis. 2005) 
(citing Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1990)) (noting that the 
substantive relevance test requires that “the forum contacts must be necessary to the 
proof of the cause of action”). 
 156. This test is analogous to the common law tort rule of causation, requiring but 
for causation, and proximate cause between the forum contacts and the cause of 
action.  See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 
960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 
1067, 1068–69 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 157. Here, courts require the cause of action to “lie in the wake of” the commercial 
activity in the forum.  See, e.g., Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 
584 (Tex. 2007). 
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liability-creating events take place in the forum state for the case to be 
one of specific jurisdiction.158 
The Supreme Court has done a masterful job of ducking the issue.  
In Helicopteros Nacionales, at least some of the events giving rise to 
liability may have taken place in the forum state of Texas.159  One of 
the allegations was that negligent pilot training led to the helicopter 
crash in South America, and at least some training took place in 
Texas.160  The majority, however, held that the plaintiffs had conceded 
a lack of relatedness and thus avoided specific jurisdiction analysis.161  
Justice Brennan’s solo dissent did not read the plaintiffs’ brief as 
conceding the issue.162  He noted the different formulations in 
International Shoe and argued that liability strictly arising from the contacts 
was not a constitutional requirement for specific jurisdiction.163 
In the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,164 
the facts fit the quintessential vacation case with the defendant’s in-
forum advertising inducing the plaintiff to take a cruise outside of 
Washington—the forum state and her home.165  The plaintiff slipped 
and fell on the deck of the cruise ship, sustaining an injury, while the 
ship was at sea.166  The back of her ticket, however, contained a clause 
limiting the forum to Florida.167  The Ninth Circuit held the forum-
selection clause unenforceable on unconscionability grounds and, 
applying the but for test, ruled that the defendant’s in-forum 
advertising efforts were related contacts because they were part of the 
sequence of events leading to the accident.168  The Supreme Court, 
                                               
 158. See, e.g., Marino, 793 F.2d at 430; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 588. 
 159. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 410–11 
(1984) (noting that the petitioner negotiated the contract in Texas, purchased goods 
from Texas, and sent pilots and management to Texas for training). 
 160. Id. at 411. 
 161. Id. at 415. 
 162. Id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 425, 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever 
the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts between the defendant and 
the forum.” (emphasis added)). 
 164. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 165. Id. at 379. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 386, 388–89 (noting that the defendant solicited the plaintiffs in 
Washington, and declining to enforce the forum-selection provision of the ticket 
because it was not freely bargained for). 
436 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:413 
 
however, ruled the forum-selection clause enforceable and never 
reached the question of whether the contacts were related.169 
The Supreme Court addressed, in passing, the relatedness of 
contacts in its recent opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.170  In that case, 
about 600 plaintiffs from thirty-four states brought an action in 
California state court alleging that the defendant’s blood-thinning 
drug Plavix injured them.171  All of the Justices agreed that general 
jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant’s principal place of 
business was in New York and it was incorporated in Delaware.172  
About ninety of the plaintiffs were California residents; as to 
jurisdiction over their claims, there was no dispute because they had 
been prescribed the pill and ingested it in California.173  But as to the 
non-California-resident plaintiffs, the Court found specific jurisdiction 
lacking because the only relationship between their suits and 
California was that they had engaged in similar conduct—being 
prescribed and ingesting the pills—in their home states as a result of a 
national campaign to market Plavix.174  The eight-vote majority opinion 
shed no light on whether it viewed “arising from,” “related to,” and 
“connected with” as setting any different standard in the relationship of 
the contacts for specific jurisdiction purposes because in the majority’s 
view, parallel conduct could not suffice under any theory.175 
Justice Sotomayor dissented.  She viewed the contacts as related 
because of the national reach of the defendant and because California 
was home to a company that had marketed Plavix.176  She also pointed 
out the efficiency of having the essentially identical cases heard in one 
forum instead of thirty-four.177 
                                               
 169. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 589 (“Because we find the forum-selection clause 
to be dispositive of this question, we need not consider petitioner’s constitutional 
argument as to personal jurisdiction.”). 
 170. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
 171. Id. at 1778. 
 172. See id. at 1778–79 (noting that the issue of general jurisdiction was properly 
decided by the lower court); see also id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
that the case lacked general jurisdiction). 
 173. Id. at 1782 (majority opinion) (considering claim of lack of specific jurisdiction 
only as to non-resident plaintiffs). 
 174. Id. at 1783. 
 175. Id. at 1782 (“[A]ll the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred 
elsewhere.”). 
 176. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that materially identical 
conduct in non-forum state constitutes a connected contact). 
 177. Id. at 1787. 
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Bristol-Myers shines little light on what counts as a related contact.  
The California Supreme Court’s and Justice Sotomayor’s view—that 
parallel conduct outside the forum state is sufficiently connected to 
count as a related contact—goes well beyond even the liberal but for 
test.  As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court majority dismissed it with a 
wave of the hand, giving no hint as to how it would approach a vacation 
case or similar fact pattern.178 
F.  Virtual Contacts 
All of the Supreme Court’s decisions, including the recent ones, are 
decidedly old school.  They have involved things such as industrial 
machines sold at trade shows,179 injuries working on a railroad,180 tire 
blowouts,181 and so on.  Justice Stephen Breyer’s controlling 
concurrence in the judgment in J. McIntyre expressly addressed the 
possibility that the calculus might change if a case involved a product 
marketed and sold through a large online distributor such as 
Amazon.182  The possibility that virtual contacts might raise different 
considerations earned a brief mention in Walden.183  But these asides 
give lower courts no guidance. 
Showing how desperate lower courts are for some path markers, in 
vast numbers they latched onto the Western District of Pennsylvania 
case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.184  Zippo, an 
Internet trademark infringement dispute between two companies both 
using the word “Zippo,” proposed a sliding scale from highly 
interactive web sites to purely passive ones, the latter being essentially 
                                               
 178. See id. at 1781–82 (reasoning that no connection existed between the forum 
state, California, and the claims non-residents brought in California for incidents 
occurring outside the state because the plaintiffs were not California residents and had 
not been harmed by conduct in California). 
 179. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011) (plurality 
opinion). 
 180. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553–54 (2017). 
 181. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 
(2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987) (plurality 
opinion). 
 182. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 880 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(questioning the extent of the majority’s holding in cases where a company “targets 
the world” through internet advertising and sales). 
 183. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014) (describing “virtual 
contacts” as a difficult question best left “for another day”). 
 184. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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billboards on the Internet.185  The higher the level of interactivity, the 
greater the chance of establishing jurisdiction.186  Zippo will go down in 
history as one of the most frequently cited district court cases.187 
While Zippo was an admirable effort to bring order to the chaos, two 
decades hence its sliding scale is obsolete.188  Even the humblest blogs 
are interactive in the sense that readers can post comments and email 
the blogger.  Big distributors like Amazon have achieved a level of 
interactivity unimaginable when Zippo was written.189  Not only can one 
search and compare items for purchase, based on one’s past usage, 
such sites will suggest purchases and remind you of relatives’ birthdays, 
to say nothing of gift-giving holidays.  So-called “Cyber Monday” has 
begun to rival “Black Friday” in sales.190  Thus, critical issues are 
unresolved in common fact patterns.  Vast numbers of online 
purchases are made through highly interactive sites, yet it is not clear 
whether this means that the consumer should always be able to sue at 
home regarding a dispute involving the purchase. 
Another confused area is internet libel.  Even the most passive of 
websites can convey a poisonous message visible to anyone with 
unfiltered access to the internet.191  In particular, the Court’s decision 
in Keeton suggests that libel plaintiffs should be able to sue wherever 
the allegedly libelous message appears, given that the defendant in that 
                                               
 185. Id. at 1124. 
 186. See id. at 1124–25 (reasoning that the more interactive a web site is, the more 
the website owner’s conduct amounts to purposeful availment). 
 187. A 2017 Lexis search showed that federal courts had cited Zippo over 1000 times 
and state courts had cited the decision over 100 times.  The frequency with which 
courts cited the case peaked around 2005, but recent cases still follow the decision.  
See, e.g., Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, No. A-17-CA-00073-SS, 2017 WL 2841679, at *4 
(W.D. Tex. June 30, 2017). 
 188. To its credit, the Zippo court described e-commerce as being in its “infant 
stages.”  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123.  Thus, it seems doubtful that the Zippo court 
imagined its opinion would exert influence twenty years later. 
 189. Id. at 1124 (describing the highest level of interactivity at that time as when 
“the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve 
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet”). 
 190. See Charisse Jones, Cyber Monday Smashes Online Sales Record, USA TODAY (Nov. 
29, 2016, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/11/28/cyber-
monday-set-top-last-year-sales/94552948 (discussing a Cyber Monday sales record of 
$3.45 billion and a trend toward online purchasing even on Black Friday). 
 191. See Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel:  The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473, 480 (2004) (explaining that distinguishing 
between web-based and print-based libel may be difficult to justify). 
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case sold only a small percentage of its magazines in the forum state.192  
But many courts have resisted this result, demanding instead that the 
libelous communication target the state, a showing often dependent 
on whether the communication makes specific reference to the state 
and so on.193  As a result, lower courts are badly split on whether 
internet libel plaintiffs can sue at home or not.194 
II.  THE PROPOSAL 
In most cases, federal courts have the same territorial reach as their 
state court counterparts.  Such has been the law for over half a 
century.195  Currently this rule is contained in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), which provides that federal courts have personal 
jurisdiction if the defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”196  
So, as a general proposition, a federal court in Nebraska has the same 
territorial reach as a state court in Nebraska, and so on for all states. 
All states have enacted what are commonly known as long-arm 
statutes.197  With respect to common law bases of jurisdiction—such as 
                                               
 192. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772–73, 779–81 (1984) 
(permitting personal jurisdiction in a libel suit in New Hampshire even though “the 
bulk of the harm done to petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire” because the 
magazine had “continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market”); 
see also Borchers, supra note 191, at 480 (asserting that courts should treat personal 
jurisdiction in cases of libel on “passive” websites the same as cases of libel in physical 
publications because the resultant harm is equivalent). 
 193. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258–59 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“[A] court in Virginia cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the 
Connecticut-based newspaper defendants because they did not manifest an intent to 
aim their websites or the posted articles at a Virginia audience.”); Griffis v. Luban, 646 
N.W.2d 527, 535 (Minn. 2002) (“While . . . Luban’s statements were intentionally 
directed at Griffis, whom she knew to be an Alabama resident . . . nothing in the record 
indicates that the statements were targeted at the state of Alabama or at an Alabama 
audience beyond Griffis herself.”); see also Borchers, supra note 191, at 473, 486–87 
(discussing cases seemingly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton). 
 194. See Borchers, supra note 191, at 482 (identifying thirty-two post-Keeton reported 
decisions on internet libel jurisdiction, with thirteen concluding jurisdiction existed 
and nineteen concluding jurisdiction did not exist). 
 195. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(en banc) (finding no reason for federal courts to override an applicable state law in 
a diversity jurisdiction case). 
 196. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 197. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild:  How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to 
the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (2004) (elaborating that seven states 
have long-arm statutes “extend[ing] the state’s jurisdiction to the limits of due process,” 
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in-forum service of an individual or voluntary appearance—the 
common law provides the state with affirmative authority to assert 
jurisdiction, and such assertions are constitutional.198  Consequently, 
about a century ago, states began pushing the common law’s 
jurisdictional bounds with statutes.  Most prominent among these were 
non-resident motorist statutes.  These statutes appointed a state official 
as the agent for service of process for non-residents based on the 
fiction that, by using a state’s roads, an out-of-state motorist implicitly 
consented to jurisdiction over auto accident suits in that state.199  The 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes as long as 
they required reasonable notice to the non-resident, usually by having 
the state official mail the complaint and summons.200  After 
International Shoe, states began to enact more expansive general statutes 
to assert jurisdiction over all types of civil cases, hence the colloquial 
name long-arm statutes.201 
These statutes fall into two broad categories.  Some, such as 
California’s, give their courts all of the jurisdiction that the 
Constitution allows.202  Others, such as New York’s, are detailed and 
provide jurisdiction on specific bases, such as over any person who 
“transacts business within the state.”203  While in some cases the latter 
stop short of the constitutional line, they cannot go beyond 
constitutional limits.204  As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
                                               
thirty states have long-arm statutes enumerating acts that subject a nonresident to the state’s 
jurisdiction, and thirteen states have a hybrid of the two models). 
 198. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 2010) (incorporating expressly common 
law bases of jurisdiction); see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612, 615, 
619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming the common law basis of in-state service). 
 199. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (expanding the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine by condoning Massachusetts’s novel theory of implied consent 
for out-of-state motorists). 
 200. See id. at 354, 356 (noting requirement of notice by mail in upholding the 
statute); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18–19 (1928) (striking down a statute with 
no express requirement of notice even though notice was given). 
 201. See McFarland, supra note 197, at 492–96 (discussing how International Shoe 
transformed the law of personal jurisdiction by authorizing service on non-residents 
outside the forum state). 
 202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (providing that California courts 
have jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution”). 
 203. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(1). 
 204. See McFarland, supra note 197, at 492–93 (explaining that states can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over non-residents only if the jurisdiction comports with the 
Fourteenth Amendment-derived “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
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requirement of minimum contacts with the forum applies indirectly to 
federal courts, even though as organs of the federal government they 
normally would be subject to the Fifth Amendment.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has treated cases brought in federal court as if they had 
been brought in state court.205 
Rule 4(k)(1) contains two exceptions purporting to give federal 
courts broader reach, however.  One of long standing, which has 
launched thousands of Civil Procedure multiple-choice exam 
questions, is the “bulge rule.”206  The bulge rule provides that a 
supplemental party brought in by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 
or 19 is subject to service of process within 100 miles (as the crow 
flies207) of the federal courthouse, if the service takes place in the 
United States.208  It is clear from the rule that the physical act of service 
must take place in the “bulge area,” which can cover multiple states for 
many federal courthouses. 
Courts have proposed three readings of the bulge rule.  One is that 
the rule confers no extra-jurisdictional reach but merely authorizes 
delivery of the summons and complaint outside the forum state.209  
That reading, however, would render the rule meaningless, as the 
combination of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and state statutes 
that Rule 4 incorporates authorize delivery of the summons and 
complaint outside the forum state.210  Courts are divided as to whether 
a party brought in by the bulge rule must have minimum contacts with 
the bulge area or with the “bulge state,” or the state where service took 
place.211  However, under either interpretation the federal courts have 
modestly broader jurisdictional reach than their state court counterparts. 
                                               
 205. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463–64 (1985). 
 206. The bulge rule was adopted in 1963.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY 
KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 451 (7th ed. 2011). 
 207. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding 
that the proper way to measure the bulge area is to use straight-line air miles, “as the 
crow flies,” instead of road miles). 
 208. HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 487. 
 209. See, e.g., Coleman v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (involving a Pennsylvania corporation served with a summons for the 
Southern District of New York pursuant to the bulge rule despite its conducting no 
business in New York). 
 210. See id. at 251–52 (explaining that most states had already provided for out-of-
state process via long-arm statutes, which federal courts could also utilize). 
 211. HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 487 (noting that the view that 
“the defendant must have minimum contacts with the ‘bulge’ area itself” is more 
common).  Compare Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 1986) 
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The other Rule 4(k)(1) extension recognizes that Congress has 
enacted several statutes allowing nationwide service of process or using 
similar language.212  As discussed more thoroughly below, lower federal 
courts have generally construed the constitutional requirement to be 
one of minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, not 
minimum contacts with the forum state.213  Although dictum, the 
plurality opinion in J. McIntyre suggested that a national contacts test 
would apply to a federal statute giving the federal courts national reach 
in products liability cases.214 
One of the best known examples of such a statute is the federal 
interpleader statute.215  Interpleader allows the holder of a stake 
(commonly the proceeds of an insurance policy) to interplead rival 
claimants to the stake in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and the 
possibility of multiple liability.216  However, for this to be effective, the 
stakeholder needs to be able to bring all of the rival claimants to one 
forum, which would be impossible if the stakeholder could not get 
jurisdiction over all of them.  Without any fuss, federal courts have 
assumed that the grant of nationwide jurisdiction here is constitutional.217 
This brings us to the other major extension, which is Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).  Rule 4(k)(2) was drafted in response to 
the Supreme Court’s decision Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf 
Wolff & Co.218  The District Court determined that Louisiana’s long-
arm statute did not reach the defendants and dismissed the claims 
                                               
(favoring the rule that a district court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
party with minimum contacts within the 100-mile bulge area), with Coleman, 405 F.2d 
at 252–53 (holding that a district court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
party who has minimum contacts “with the state of service”). 
 212. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 22, 78aa (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(e)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(P) (2012); see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, 
supra note 21, at 480 n.6 (collecting statutes). 
 213. See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480–84 (relating how equivocal 
Supreme Court decisions led lower federal courts to construe the constitutional 
requirement as one of minimum contacts with the United States as a whole). 
 214. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884–85 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with the 
United States Government but not with the government of any individual State.  That 
would be an exceptional case . . . .  It may be that . . . the Congress could authorize the 
exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.  That circumstance is not presented in 
this case . . . .”). 
 215. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2012). 
 216. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 531–32. 
 217. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc). 
 218. 484 U.S. 97 (1987). 
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against them.219  The case was brought on a federal question theory.220  
A sharply divided Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District 
Court that the state statute applied, while the dissent opined that the 
result amounted to a “bizarre hiatus in the Rules.”221  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc ruling, holding that the 
predecessor of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) meant what it said:  if the Louisiana 
state courts would not have jurisdiction, then neither would a federal 
court situated in Louisiana.222  But along the way, the Court mentioned 
the possibility of amending the Federal Rules.223 
The Omni Capital decision spawned Rule 4(k)(2).224  Rule 4(k)(2) 
provides that, if the case is one “aris[ing] under federal law,” federal 
courts have personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit provided 
that no state could exercise jurisdiction.225  Because Rule 4(k)(2) is 
directed at federal courts, the relevant provision of the Constitution is 
the Fifth Amendment.226  Both the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Rules Advisory Committee) report and most federal 
courts applying Rule 4(k)(2) have adopted some version of the 
national contacts test.227 
My proposal is simple.  Rule 4(k)(2) should be amended by adding 
“or cases in which jurisdiction is based on Section 1332 of Title 28,” 
                                               
 219. Id. at 101–02. 
 220. Id. at 100. 
 221. See Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 
1986) (per curiam), aff’d, 484 U.S. 97; id. at 427–28 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 222. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 108 (relying on then-Rule 4(e)). 
 223. Id. at 111 (“A narrowly tailored service of process provision, authorizing service 
on an alien in a federal-question case when the alien is not amenable to service under 
the applicable state long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of . . . federal statutes.  
It is not for the federal courts, however, to create such a rule as a matter of common 
law.  That responsibility . . . better rests with those who propose the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and with Congress.”). 
 224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k), advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment 
(recounting that the amended Rule 4(k) “corrects a gap in the enforcement of federal 
law . . . respond[ing] to the suggestion of the Supreme Court made in [Omni Capital]”). 
 225. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 226. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k), advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment 
(elaborating that “[t]he Fifth Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating 
contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over that party”). 
 227. See id. (indicating that one of two versions of the national contacts test apply 
under the Fifth Amendment); HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 480–84 
(explaining that lower courts have used the three different national contacts tests). 
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which is the diversity and alienage statute, immediately after the words 
“under federal law” in the first sentence of the rule. 
III.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
Of course, no solutions to problems as intractable as those presented 
by personal jurisdiction law will either be perfect or immune from legal 
challenge.  In this Part, I consider some of the limitations of, and 
possible challenges to, my proposal. 
A.  How Much Would the Extended Rule 4(k)(2) Accomplish? 
An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would not affect cases like World-Wide 
Volkswagen and Bristol-Myers in which alternative state courts were 
available to the plaintiffs.  In World-Wide Volkswagen and Bristol-Myers, 
the plaintiffs instead could have sued the dismissed defendants in New 
York state court. 
An extended rule would, however, affect cases like J. McIntyre, 
assuming courts employ a national contacts test.  The J. McIntyre 
plurality (and to a lesser degree, the concurrence in the judgment) 
made much of the fact that the defendant had not targeted New Jersey 
specifically.228  There was, however, evidence in abundance that the 
defendant was targeting the U.S. market.229  The plurality opinion, 
                                               
 228. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 873, 886 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (declaring that a British scrap metal company did not have sufficient 
purposeful contacts with New Jersey because the company sold its products through a 
U.S. distributor; sent representatives to trade shows in several states other than New 
Jersey; had provided only four machines that ended up in New Jersey; and, in New 
Jersey, had no offices or employees, paid no taxes, owned no property, and did not 
advertise); id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the British 
company did not have sufficient contacts with New Jersey because the company wanted 
its U.S. distributor to sell its products indiscriminately to any willing purchaser in 
America; because the company’s representatives had attended trade shows in several 
U.S. cities, but not any in New Jersey; and because the U.S. distributor only once sold 
and shipped a machine to a New Jersey customer). 
 229. Id. at 896–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that McIntyre UK’s 
president attended annual scrap recycling industry conventions across the United 
States; McIntyre UK exhibited its product at trade shows with the intention of reaching 
people across the United States; a McIntyre UK engineer had installed the company’s 
equipment in several states; until 2001, McIntyre UK distributed its products 
exclusively through an independent, Ohio-based company; in a letter to the 
independent distributor’s president, “McIntyre UK’s president spoke plainly about the 
manufacturer’s objective in authorizing the exclusive distributorship:  ‘All we wish to 
do is sell our products in the [United] States—and get paid!’”; when the independent 
distributor was worried about U.S. litigation over McIntyre UK products, McIntyre UK 
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which concluded there was no jurisdiction, did not quarrel with the 
assertion that the British company had been targeting the domestic 
U.S. market.230  A letter from the defendant’s corporate officers, 
quoted by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, made it obvious that the 
corporation was trying to profit maximally from the U.S. market.231 
An extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases would 
cure the worst of the worst cases, in which a foreign corporate 
defendant purposefully and substantially benefits from the U.S. market 
but is immunized from suit in any U.S. court arising from those 
U.S. activities.  Whatever one thinks about the merits of not allowing 
the World-Wide Volkswagen, Walden, or Bristol-Myers plaintiffs to sue in 
the U.S. forum of their choice, they had other U.S. forums available.  
But Mr. Nicastro, the J. McIntyre plaintiff, had no U.S. forum.  His only 
option would be a suit in England, which likely would have been an 
impracticable pursuit.232 
                                               
“reassured its distributor that ‘the product was built and designed by McIntyre 
Machinery in the UK and the buck stops here—if there’s something wrong with the 
machine’”; the independent distributor sought guidance from McIntyre UK when 
promoting McIntyre UK’s products at conventions; and McIntyre UK had been named 
as a defendant in several states (citations omitted)). 
 230. Id. at 885 (plurality opinion) (“In this case, petitioner directed marketing and 
sales efforts at the United States.”). 
 231. Id. at 897 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg was also appropriately 
offended by the plurality’s implicit endorsement of a foreign manufacturer being able 
to “Pilate-like” wash its hands of liability for a product by passing it through a nominally 
independent distributor.  Id. at 893–94 (“Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, 
the splintered majority today ‘turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm 
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, 
need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors 
market it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the 
Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995))). 
 232. England now allows contingency fees but retains the “loser pays” rule, so if Mr. 
Nicastro were to lose he would be liable for the defense’s attorney’s fees.  See Quinn 
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Contingency Fees in England After April 2013, 
LEXOLOGY, (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g= 
f053e1a5-6992-4ef0-a9d8-9bef404a85e6.  By one estimate, tort recoveries in the United 
States are roughly ten times those in England.  See P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the 
Alternatives:  Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1012.  Thus, even 
if Mr. Nicastro’s lawyers had been able to foresee the jurisdictional dismissal, it seems 
unlikely that they would have seen it as a viable proposition to find an English lawyer 
and sue there.  Moreover, Mr. Nicastro was injured on October 11, 2001.  See Nicastro 
v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 
987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873.  The statute of 
limitations in England for personal injuries resulting from negligence is three years 
from discovery of the injury, or six years from the injury, whichever is later, subject to 
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The revised Rule 4(k)(2) also will not clear up, in domestic cases 
anyway, troublesome issues such as whether a contact is related or the 
weight of virtual contacts.  Those issues will have to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court, I hope in a sensible fashion.233  But, at the very least, 
it would end the absurdity of the Mr. Nicastros of the world having no 
U.S. remedy except what modest amount they might get in a workers’ 
compensation forum. 
I agree with Professor Sachs that a federal statute dealing in a 
sensible way with all or most of the messy jurisdictional issues would be 
better, in theory, than extending Rule 4(k)(2).234  But the statutory 
solution will not come to pass.  As Professor Sachs notes, in 2009, the 
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (FMLAA) was 
introduced in the House with multiple versions submitted in 
subsequent Congresses.235  Every iteration of it has failed to advance.236  
The bill is reminiscent of the old implied consent statutes in that, via 
federal regulatory agencies, it would require foreign companies to 
appoint agents for service of process and then would deem that 
appointment consent to personal jurisdiction in the state where the 
agent is located.237  As Professor Sachs notes, groups supportive of tort 
plaintiffs endorsed the bill, which had sponsors from both parties, but 
it still proved controversial.238 
                                               
a maximum period of fifteen years from the negligent act.  Limitation Periods, THOMAS 
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2016, Practical Law, 1-518-8770.  Thus, the statute of limitations in 
England barred Mr. Nicastro from recovering damages.  It seems likely that most tort 
victims with close cases as to jurisdiction would attempt to bring the case in a U.S. 
forum and, if dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, would not pursue the matter in a 
foreign court for some combination of these reasons. 
 233. Based on the Court’s recent performance, I am not holding my breath. 
 234. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1325, 1330–31 (arguing that extending Rule 4(k)(2) 
“would preserve some troubling aspects of current law,” e.g., plaintiffs would likely still 
end up in inconvenient forums, and proposing instead that Congress enact a bill to 
establish nationwide personal jurisdiction for federal courts). 
 235. See id. at 1325–26; see also H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1910, 113th 
Cong. (2013); H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 1606, 
111th Cong. (2009).  When the first version of the bill was introduced in 2009, 
Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the White House.  Currently 
Republicans control all three.  Party alignment in the federal government has not 
affected the fate of the FMLAA. 
 236. The latest version is H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. (2015).  The FMLAA has not yet 
been introduced in the 115th Congress. 
 237. Id. § 5. 
 238. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 1325–26. 
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An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would be preferable for several reasons.  
First, although the rulemaking process is hardly simple, it is not the 
dismal political swamp that Congress is.  If the FMLAA cannot advance, 
a bill offering a comprehensive statute directly affecting domestic 
defendants would be dead on arrival.  U.S. business interests would 
fight vigorously against giving back the jurisdictional bonuses that the 
five defense-friendly decisions of this decade have handed them, the 
most important of which was—perhaps ironically—penned by one of 
the Court’s most liberal members, Justice Ginsburg, in limiting general 
jurisdiction over a corporation to its home.239  Equally ironic, Justice 
Kennedy—perhaps the Court’s most vigorous proponent of the power 
of state sovereignty against the federal government240—reasoned that 
sovereignty can give the federal courts personal jurisdiction that the 
Constitution does not permit state courts.241 
Second, the bill is limited to certain kinds of products and claims on 
them.242  An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would not be so limited because it 
would apply to the full range of legal theories brought in diversity and 
alienage cases. 
Third, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would work to the benefit of both 
U.S. plaintiffs and defendants and result in fairer outcomes.  Most 
cases covered by the extended rule would look like J. McIntyre or 
J. McIntyre with a U.S. co-defendant.  If one takes the J. McIntyre facts 
but instead assumes the defendant is incorporated in Delaware with its 
principal place of business in New York (rather than both in England), 
the defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in New York and 
Delaware.  Pursuing a case against the defendant in New York or Delaware 
is a far more tenable proposition than trying to litigate in England.243  
Thus, the English defendant has a considerable competitive advantage 
over the hypothetical U.S. defendant because the former can avoid 
relatively generous U.S. juries, while the latter cannot.244 
                                               
 239. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 929 (2011). 
 240. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711, 757 (1999) (establishing that state 
sovereign immunity prevents application of federal wage and hour laws to state employees). 
 241. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 242. H.R. 3304, 114th Cong. § 4(4) (listing the types of products to which the bill 
would apply). 
 243. See supra note 232. 
 244. See Atiyah, supra note 232, at 1012 (finding that tort recovery in the United 
States is typically ten times greater than in England). 
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If one assumes the facts of J. McIntyre but with a U.S. co-defendant,245 
an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would work to the advantage of the U.S. 
co-defendant.  It would be a considerable benefit to the U.S. defendant 
to have the foreign defendant joined.  If the U.S. defendant arguably 
is jointly and severally liable with the foreign defendant, the U.S. 
defendant could easily file an impleader claim against the foreign 
defendant in the same action if they were in the same court.246  If the 
foreign defendant is not a party to the proceeding, then the U.S. 
defendant would be left in the position of the Asahi defendant, 
attempting to pursue a separate contribution and indemnity action in 
a foreign court.247  Moreover, in the highly likely event that the case 
settles, the U.S. defendant would have the foreign defendant at the 
settlement table to contribute to any resolution, rather than 
attempting to calculate the odds and economics of passing off any 
portion of the settlement to an absent party. 
While not comprehensive, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) is a realistic 
possibility and a broad federal statute is not.  While an extended rule 
would not solve all the problems that jurisdictional law presents, it 
would solve the worst of them to the benefit of U.S. plaintiffs, 
defendants, and the fair administration of justice. 
B. Would Extending Rule 4(k)(2) Violate the Rules Enabling Act? 
Federal Rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
created by a relatively elaborate procedure controlled mainly by the 
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference and the Rules 
Advisory Committee.248  The latter drafts and proposes amendments to 
the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court chooses whether to promulgate 
them, and then Congress has several months to veto them.249  For the 
                                               
 245. There was a U.S. co-defendant in J. McIntyre, the U.S. distributor of the 
machines. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), 
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873.  However, the U.S. distributor ceased to 
distribute McIntyre machines in 2001.  See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  This is because the distributor went bankrupt.  See Nicastro v. McIntyre 
Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575, 
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873.  Thus, for practical purposes, the case was solely 
against the English J. McIntyre. 
 246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
 247. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114–15 (1987) 
(noting that the third-party claim should be dismissed and is possibly governed by 
different law than the underlying claim). 
 248. See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 333–34 (describing the rulemaking process). 
 249. See id. 
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most part, the proposed amendments are enacted in the form they 
leave the Rules Advisory Committee’s hands, though several decades 
ago there was the noted congressional override and a poorly drafted 
rewrite of the service-of-process rules.250 
The Rules Enabling Act251 authorizes rules if they do not “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”252  Because federal rules are 
authorized by a federal statute, they are largely immune from the 
doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,253 which has come to be 
understood to allow federal common law rules only if they will not 
promote forum shopping or result in inequitable administration of the 
laws.254  Federal rules are within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act as 
long as they “really regulate procedure.”255  Or, as Justice John M. Harlan 
put it, a federal rule need only be “arguably procedural” to pass muster.256 
Contending successfully that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
violates the Rules Enabling Act is an uphill climb, to say the least.  
Because the rule must pass through the Supreme Court’s hands, for a 
litigant to successfully challenge a rule the litigant would have to 
convince a lower court and then possibly the Supreme Court itself that 
the Court erred in adopting the rule.257 
                                               
 250. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 441 (highlighting the stark difference 
between the quality of proposed amendments based on the body that submits them, 
be it Congress or the Rules Advisory Committee). 
 251. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 252. § 2072(b). 
 253. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 254. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (holding that the outcome-
determination test cannot be read without referencing the twin aims of Erie regarding 
forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws). 
 255. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 256. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 257. There have been a couple of close calls, however.  At least twice, the Court has 
read rules in implausibly narrow fashions, apparently to avoid a serious argument that 
the rule was not really regulating procedure.  In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 
740 (1980), the Supreme Court read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3—which states 
when an action “is commenced by filing a complaint”—as not affecting the Oklahoma 
rule that statutes of limitation stop when the complaint and summons is served, not 
when the plaintiff files the complaint.  Id. at 750–51.  As a result, Federal Rule 3 was 
left with almost no meaning.  The Supreme Court was concerned that reading Federal 
Rule 3 as trumping the stop-on-service rule would interfere with an Oklahoma 
substantive policy decision.  Id. at 751.  In Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 
U.S. 497 (2001), the Supreme Court read language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41—which governs voluntary dismissals—regarding if a dismissal is “with prejudice” as 
only precluding refiling of the action in the same federal court that the first action was 
filed.  Id. at 505.  The Court was concerned that if Rule 41 were read to preclude an 
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain two provisions that 
extend personal jurisdiction of federal courts beyond that of their state 
court counterparts.  One is the long-standing bulge rule that gives a 
100-mile bonus to federal courts in haling supplemental parties under 
Rules 14 and 19.258  The other is the current version of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), which is limited to federal question cases.259 
One might argue that the federal courts have special powers that 
allow for Rule 4(k)(2) for federal question cases but not diversity cases.  
However, it is difficult to see why this should be so.  Diversity 
jurisdiction has existed since the First Judiciary Act of 1789, while 
general federal question jurisdiction did not become a permanent 
fixture until after the Civil War.260  So it cannot be argued seriously that 
federal question jurisdiction is more fundamental than diversity.  The 
likely reason for current Rule 4(k)(2)’s limitation to federal question 
cases is that it was a response to Omni Capital, which was a federal 
question case.261  When the Rules Advisory Committee proposed Rule 
4(k)(2) in its current form, it referred only to the special powers of 
federal courts without any reference to the basis upon which they 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction.262  Although lower court cases 
addressing whether these provisions in the federal rules violate the 
Rules Enabling Act are not plentiful, they come down on the side of 
upholding the relevant rule.263  Extending Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and 
                                               
action in a state court in another state that Rule 41 would violate the basic federalism 
goals of Erie.  Id. 
 258. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 218–27 and accompanying text. 
 260. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 206, at 102 (explaining that it was not until 1875 
that Congress gave federal courts original jurisdiction over federal question cases); id. 
at 143 (“Ever since the First Judiciary Act, the federal courts have had original 
jurisdiction of so-called diversity cases, those involving a controversy between citizens 
of different states or between a citizen of a state and an alien.”). 
 261. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 100 (1987) 
(noting that the original complaints were filed under the federal Securities laws). 
 262.  
There remain constitutional limitations on the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction by federal courts over persons outside the United States.  These 
restrictions arise from the Fifth Amendment rather than from the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which limits state-court reach and which was incorporated into 
federal practice by the reference to state law in the text of the former 
subdivision (e) that is deleted by this revision. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (emphasis added). 
 263. See, e.g., Keith v. Freiberg, 621 F.2d 318, 319 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that Rule 4(d)(7), (e), and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules 
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alienage cases would be at least as arguably procedural as the bulge 
rule and the current version of Rule 4(k)(2).264 
C. Is Basing Federal Court Personal Jurisdiction on  
National Contacts Constitutional? 
Unless some form of a national contacts test applies to the proposed 
extension of Rule 4(k)(2), it would all be for naught.  The Mr. Nicastros of 
the world would still be left without a U.S. forum against foreign defendants. 
As noted above, it is difficult to see why the difference between 
extending personal jurisdiction in diversity and federal question cases 
should present any constitutionally significant distinction.  As the 
Rules Advisory Committee noted, it is the fact that a federal court is 
hearing the case that brings into play the Fifth rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment.265  Moreover, the venerable bulge rule—
which is not limited to federal question cases—would become 
ineffectual in diversity cases if minimum contacts with the forum state 
is a constitutional command both to state and federal courts in non-
federal question cases.266 
Of course, this assumes that the national contacts test, in one form 
or another, is the Fifth Amendment limitation.  The Supreme Court 
has played coy on this issue.  In Stafford v. Briggs,267 the Court resolved 
the case on statutory grounds.  In his dissent, however, Justice Stewart, 
                                               
Enabling Act are constitutional); cf. Archangel Diamond Corp. Liquidating Tr. v. OAO 
Lukoil, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1365 (D. Colo. 2014), aff’d, 812 F.3d 799 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(applying Rule 4(k)(2) in determining whether jurisdiction is proper in the face of 
constitutional challenges to such jurisdiction); Dechand v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732 F. Supp. 
1120, 1122 (D. Kan. 1990) (upholding federal rules governing joinder in light of 
Kansas statute). 
 264. Other federal rules extend the reach of federal courts.  Admiralty 
Supplemental Rules B and C have been interpreted to create nationwide personal 
jurisdiction in admiralty cases where the vessel is seized and Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f) 
gives bankruptcy courts nationwide personal jurisdiction.  See HAY, BORCHERS & 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 494–97.  In admiralty proceedings, the “general common 
law” still applies, and in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts (suits by and 
against the debtor) state law applies.  See, e.g., In re Kewanee Boiler Corp., 270 B.R. 912, 
925 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he mere presence of state law issues does not mean 
that jurisdiction over bankruptcy issues should be left to the state courts . . . .”).  The 
applicable law has no bearing on whether the national contacts standard applies. 
 265. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment 
(“These restrictions arise from the Fifth Amendment rather than from the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 266. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 267. 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
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joined by Justice Brennan, disagreed with the majority’s statutory 
reading, and reached the constitutional issue of whether a federal 
court could exercise national personal jurisdiction.268  They concluded 
that minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, not the 
forum state, was the constitutional requirement under the Fifth 
Amendment.269  The majority opinion neither endorsed nor rejected 
the dissent’s proposed constitutional test.  In two cases in 1987 
involving foreign defendants, the Court wrote brief footnotes stating 
that the Fifth Amendment standard was not relevant because 
Fourteenth Amendment standards were applicable under what is now 
Rule 4(k)(1)(A); thus, the Court had no need to decide the issue and 
said the same in throwaway dictum in Bristol-Myers.270 
Lower courts take various views.  One is the pure national contacts 
standard, which allows jurisdiction in any federal court anywhere in 
the United States, if the defendant has minimum contacts with the 
United States.271  At the other pole is the view that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment standards are identical.272  The middle view is 
that while the national contacts test is the basic one, the plaintiff 
                                               
 268. Id. at 553–54 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 173 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) 
(leaving open the question of whether the Fifth Amendment applies to federal court 
personal jurisdiction); Omni Capital Int’l. Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 
102 n.5 (1987) (stating the court has no occasion to address the Fifth Amendment’s 
applicability to personal jurisdiction through national contacts); Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (declining to address 
congressional authority of granting personal jurisdiction to federal courts “over alien 
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts”). 
 271. See, e.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 
2003) (per curiam) (holding that a federal court’s minimum contacts analysis must 
look to a corporation’s contacts with the United States as a whole to determine if the 
federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process); Med. 
Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001); In re LIBOR-Based Fin. 
Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 2015 WL 6243526, at *23 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) (agreeing that the national contacts test is consistent with 
Second Circuit precedent), rev’d in part on rehearing, 11 MD 2262 (NRB), 2016 WL 
1301175 (Mar. 31, 2016); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 
(D.D.C. 2010) (applying the national contacts test as the test for diversity jurisdiction); 
see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 21, at 497 (discussing the application 
of pure national contacts test as the standard in bankruptcy cases). 
 272. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A., 119 F.3d 
935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting appellee’s argument that under both Amendments, 
courts must look past the defendant’s contacts with the forum state). 
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cannot pick out an unreasonably inconvenient forum.273  The middle 
view has found favor among commentators.274  A majority of the lower 
federal courts facing the issue appear to have adopted some form of 
the national contacts test.275 
There are other strong suggestions that some form of the national 
contacts test applies under the Fifth Amendment.276  The 1993 Rules 
Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 4(k)(2) assume that some form of 
the national contacts test applies.277  If some form of the national 
contacts test does not apply, Rule 4(k)(2) would be of almost no effect.  
Rule 4(k)(2)(A) requires that “the defendant is not subject to 
jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction.”278  If the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment standards are identical, Rule 4(k)(2) would 
be of effect only in the rare case that the defendant had minimum 
contacts with a forum state that has a long-arm statute that stops short of 
the constitutional line, the defendant’s contacts fall between the 
constitutional and statutory lines, and no other state is available.  Moreover, 
the venerable bulge rule279 would be of no effect.  Congress also clearly 
believes that it has the power to authorize federal court personal 
jurisdiction on a nationwide basis as it has several times so legislated.280 
The Supreme Court plurality in J. McIntyre also appeared to endorse 
the possibility of broader personal jurisdiction for federal courts.  
Recognizing the implications of its sovereignty-based approach, the 
plurality wrote:  “Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a 
defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States, but not of any particular State.”281  Then later, 
after noting that the defendant clearly targeted the U.S. market, the 
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 275. See id. at 482–83; see also BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d at 948 (suggesting a regional 
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plurality stated:  “It may be that, assuming it were otherwise 
empowered to legislate on the subject, the Congress could authorize 
the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.”282  The plurality also 
did not attach any significance to the applicable law: “Nor is it 
necessary to determine what substantive law might apply were 
Congress to authorize jurisdiction in a federal court in New Jersey.”283 
All of this appears to be an endorsement of the constitutionality of 
an extension of Rule 4(k)(2) to diversity and alienage cases and a 
rejection of the suggestion that the applicable law makes a difference.  
The plaintiff in J. McIntyre could only have brought the action in 
federal court on alienage grounds, as products liability law is state law.  
The only arguably significant difference is that extending Rule 4(k)(2) 
would not be direct action by Congress.  But as discussed above, it 
would be a permissible exercise of the power granted by Congress 
under the Rules Enabling Act, and Congress would be able to veto the 
change.  Thus, it is difficult to see why—under the plurality’s view—it 
would make any constitutional difference had Mr. Nicastro been 
allowed to bring his action in New Jersey federal court under an 
extended Rule 4(k)(2) or a federal statute. 
Of course, this only accounts for four votes on the Court and flows 
from a sovereignty rationale that the concurrence in the judgment did 
not remark on and the dissent rejected.284  But it seems likely that the 
Justices who signed the J. McIntyre concurrence or the dissent would 
find an extended Rule 4(k)(2) constitutional, even if they rested their 
votes on a fairness rather than a sovereignty rationale.  An extended 
Rule 4(k)(2) would apply directly only to foreign defendants because 
had the J. McIntyre defendant been domestic, the plaintiff could have 
sued the defendant corporation in its home state.285  The dissent 
argued that it was unfair for a “foreign industrialist” to take advantage 
of the U.S. market, yet be immunized from suit in the most convenient 
U.S. forum.286  The concurrence’s reluctance to lay down absolutist 
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(2011) (explaining that a court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign 
subsidiary of a U.S.-based corporation only when the corporation’s affiliations with the 
forum state are continuous and systematic). 
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2017] EXTENDING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(K)(2) 455 
 
anti-jurisdictional rules would militate against any blanket finding that 
an extended Rule 4(k)(2) is unconstitutional.287 
As a practical matter, an extended Rule 4(k)(2) would apply mainly 
in cases that look like J. McIntyre.288  Under any version of a national 
contacts test, the defendant would have to purposefully direct its 
commercial activities toward the United States to its benefit.289  
Inevitably, there will be at least one state in which the bulk of the 
operative events took place, as was so with New Jersey in J. McIntyre.  As 
the dissenting Justices already think it constitutional to sue in that 
state, they surely would find jurisdiction under an extended Rule 
4(k)(2).  For the plurality Justices, if there were federal law 
authorization, their sovereignty concerns would be addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to diversity and 
alienage cases would not resolve all the uncertainties and—in my 
view—unfair results produced by current jurisdictional law.  But it 
would likely cure the worst of the injustices, which is leaving a U.S. 
plaintiff with no U.S. forum when a defendant exploiting the U.S. 
market injures the plaintiff in the United States and the suit is based 
on the defendant’s U.S. activities.  Extending Rule 4(k)(2) requires 
meeting and overcoming two substantial legal objections.  The first is 
whether the extension would be allowed under the Rules Enabling Act.  
However, the Supreme Court has twice promulgated rules giving 
federal courts personal jurisdiction that their state court counterparts 
do not have.  One is the bulge rule extending a federal court’s reach 
to 100 miles from the courthouse over supplemental parties brought 
in under either Federal Rule 14 or 19.290  The other is the current 
version of Rule 4(k)(2).  Although the Supreme Court has never ruled 
on the question, the bulk of the authorities—including hints from the 
Supreme Court itself—suggest that the Fifth Amendment (which 
would be applicable instead of the Fourteenth) is satisfied by minimum 
contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than the more 
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familiar rule that there must be minimum contacts with the forum 
state.  An extended Rule 4(k)(2) would be a practicable way to 
promote the fair administration of justice. 
